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This study investigated how judgments of guilt are influenced by factual errors in confessions 
that either amplified or downplayed the severity of the crime. Participants read a confession 
statement and a police report. Information in the confession statement either was consistent 
with the facts of the crime in the police report, the suspect admitted to a worse crime than 
described in the police report, or the suspect admitted to a lesser crime than described in the 
police report. Mediation analyses showed that, compared to consistent confessions, both 
types of directional errors reduced judgments of guilt. Inconsistencies that made the suspect 
look better—but not those that made the suspect look worse—also increased judgments of 
guilt via a direct effect. Confessions that contain errors that appear to exaggerate the severity 
of the crime prompt no higher judgments of suspect guilt than confessions that are consistent 
with the facts of the crime. However, errors in confessions that are perceived to downplay the 
severity of the crime can prompt an increased perception of suspect guilt, when compared to 
a consistent confession.  
Keywords: attribution theory, false confession, juror decision-making, inconsistencies, 
wrongful conviction 
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How downplaying crime severity in a confession affects judgments of guilt 
False confessions have resulted in a surprising number of wrongful convictions, with 
the percentage of false confessions implicated in DNA exoneration cases estimated anywhere 
between 16% (Garrett, 2011) and 25% ("Innocence Project," 2017). These numbers stand in 
contrast to the commonly held belief that innocent people will not confess unless mentally ill 
or tortured (Leo & Ofshe, 1998). Contributing to wrongful conviction rates is the difficulty 
police investigators and jurors have in discovering and discounting false confessions, with a 
general inclination to simply trust that a confession is true. Drizin and Leo (2004) found that 
30 out of 37 proven false confessors (81%) who decided to go to trial, were found guilty by 
the jury, even after pleading not guilty. This highlights not only the overall acceptance of 
confessions, but the unparalleled power that confessions hold in courts (Kassin & Neumann, 
1997), even when retracted (Kassin & Sukel, 1997; Ofshe & Leo, 1997). 
Jurors are not always best equipped with the knowledge or skills needed to effectively 
apply court instructions, evidence, and legal arguments to their decisions, and might instead 
use heuristics that are not reliable in the unique circumstances of a court case (Bornstein & 
Greene, 2011). One reason why people find confessions so convincing is the strength of the 
heuristic that assumes that, as there is no advantage to confessing, the confession must be 
true. However, there is conflicting evidence in the literature about whether this heuristic is 
robust in the face of inconsistent confession evidence. While inconsistencies in eyewitness 
testimony have been shown to reduce the credibility of the witness testimony and the 
likelihood of conviction (e.g. Berman, Narby & Cutler, 1995), inconsistencies in confessions 
are often perceived as having minimal impact on jurors’ verdicts (Malloy & Lamb, 2010). 
However, some laboratory studies have found that inconsistencies can lead participants to 
reject a confession, resulting in a lower conviction rate (Henderson & Levett, 2016; Jones, 
Bandy, & Palmer Jr., 2019; Palmer, Button, Barnett, & Brewer, 2016; Woesthoff & 
2 
CRIME SEVERITY INCONSISTENCIES IN CONFESSIONS 
Meissner, 2016). Such conflicting findings in the context of confessions may be due to 
different presentations of inconsistencies being interpreted differently by jurors, such as one 
suspect giving multiple contradictory statements, versus a suspect giving a single confession 
that contradicts the facts of the crime (e.g., Jones et al., 2019). There is also the possibility 
that jurors might process confession inconsistencies differently according to the direction of 
the inconsistency - that is, where the inconsistency appears to increase or decrease the 
severity of the crime.  
Directional errors 
The direction of confession inconsistencies can be important if we think about how 
false confessions come about. Innocent people sometimes confess to a crime without 
adequate consideration of the consequences. This occurs because the person believes 
confessing is the only way to stop a stressful interrogation and begin the process of clearing 
their name (Kassin, 2005, 2012; Leo & Drizin, 2010). In order to produce a confession 
believable enough to satisfy the interrogator, the innocent suspect creates a story using the 
information they have at hand. This might include details that have been learned during the 
interrogation process, seen in the media, or those which could be deduced using logic or 
common sense. However, the innocent suspect is at a disadvantage when creating an accurate 
confession as they do not have first-hand knowledge of the crime. In their ignorance of the 
specifics of the crime, the suspect might inadvertently understate or overstate key details, 
such as admitting to shooting the victim too few or too many times compared to the actual 
wounds inflicted. While research has been conducted into the effects of confession 
inconsistencies on perception of suspect guilt, the effect of directional errors that might 
reasonably be expected of an innocent suspect, have not to our knowledge been investigated.  
In particular, understanding the effect of understating the crime (inadvertently or 
otherwise), is important as some police interrogation techniques may increase the possibility 
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of a suspect confessing to an understated version of a crime. The commonly used Reid 
technique (Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2013) advocates the use of minimization in the 
police interrogation process, in which the police officer attempts to elicit a confession by 
downplaying the severity or consequences of the crime and providing the suspect with face-
saving excuses for their involvement. By lessening the perception of the severity of the crime, 
minimization could inadvertently encourage false narratives with inconsistencies that indicate 
the desire for minimal culpability. The use of such minimization techniques has been shown 
to increase the likelihood of both true and false confessions alike (Russano, Meissner, 
Narchet, & Kassin, 2005), providing an important reason for investigating the effect of 
directional errors on how jurors perceive the suspect’s level of guilt when processing 
confession evidence. 
The aim of the present study was to investigate how factual errors in confessions that 
either amplified or downplayed the severity of the crime influenced judgments of guilt. 
Attribution Theory 
Kelley’s (1973) attribution theory holds that the inferences an observer draws from 
another’s behavior depends on attributions about the motive underlying that behavior. An 
important implication of this principle is that a particular behavior can lead to very different 
inferences depending on the attributions made by the observer. An example of this principle, 
provided by Reeder, Vonk, Ronk, Ham & Lawrence (2004), involves an observer who sees a 
student helping a professor. Without additional context, the observer may attribute this 
behavior to the student’s helpful nature. However, if the observer is aware of an ulterior 
motive (e.g., the professor is evaluating the student’s scholarship application), the helping 
behavior may be attributed to the pursuit of this ulterior motive rather than the student having 
a helpful nature. In this case, the perceived presence of an ulterior motive leads to 
discounting; that is, the helping behavior is discounted when making inferences about the 
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disposition of the student. In contrast, some contextual information can lead to augmentation, 
whereby an observed behavior has a stronger effect on dispositional attributions. For 
example, if a student helps a professor without the professor’s knowledge, this might enhance 
an observer’s attributions about the student having a helpful nature; if the professor is 
unaware, it reduces the scope for any ulterior motive to explain the behaviour. Thus, the same 
behavior (a student helping a professor) can lead to very different inferences about the 
underlying cause of the behavior, depending on the attributions made by the observer. 
Although the principles of discounting and augmentation were developed in the 
context of making dispositional attributions, we can consider how they might help explain 
how jurors interpret directional inconsistencies in a confession. We assume that jurors are 
motivated to explain inconsistencies in confessions and will seek explanations for them 
(Palmer et al., 2016).  Further, we expect that the inferences drawn from inconsistencies in 
confession evidence will vary systematically depending on the direction of the inconsistency. 
For example, if the evidence shows that the suspect has confessed to a crime that is less 
severe than the facts would imply (e.g., admitting to firing one shot when there is evidence 
three were fired), the juror might reason that the suspect is lying in an attempt to make 
themselves look less guilty to attract a lesser penalty. If so, then according to the discounting 
principle, inconsistencies that imply a less severe version of the crime might not translate into 
reduced perceptions of guilt (relative to a confession without inconsistencies). However, if 
the evidence shows that the suspect has confessed to a worse version of the crime (e.g., firing 
10 shots), the juror might reasonably wonder what the suspect has to gain by lying in such a 
manner. As there is no perceived benefit in confessing to a crime of greater magnitude, the 
juror might suspect that the confession is the result of an unknown motive unrelated to guilt 
(e.g., perhaps the defendant is innocent and was pressured to confess). In turn, inconsistencies 
that imply a more severe version of the crime will lead to reduced perceptions of guilt 
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(relative to a confession without inconsistencies). In this way, attribution theory provides a 
framework for investigating how jurors not only rationalise the presence of errors in a 
confession, but also how they investigate the types of motivations that might underpin the 
directionality of those errors.1 
Although no prior studies have directly compared inconsistencies that imply a more 
severe versus less severe crime, two published studies have included manipulations of 
inconsistencies with some directional properties. Palmer et al. (2016) manipulated 
inconsistencies by including three details in a confession statement that differed from verified 
facts in a police case file. Two of these concerned non-directional details (e.g., the time of 
crime occurred) but the third detail implied that the suspect confessed to a crime more severe 
than actually occurred: the confession stated that the victim had been shot five times whereas 
the police file stated that the victim had been shot once. In two experiments that included this 
manipulation, participants were less likely to convict if they read a confession that was 
inconsistent with the case file than one that was consistent with the case file. 
Henderson and Levett (2016) had participants read a confession that contained errors 
that downplayed the severity of the crime. The suspect confessed to stabbing the victim 1-2 
times, and the police case report stated that the victim was stabbed either 1-2 times 
(consistent condition) or 38 times (inconsistent condition). In two experiments using this 
manipulation, the manipulation of inconsistency had a marginal or null effect on verdicts. In a 
third experiment, the direction of the inconsistency was counterbalanced such that some 
participants read a confession that exaggerated the severity of the crime and others read a 
confession that downplayed the severity of the crime. However, comparing inconsistencies of 
                                                          
1 We note that these ideas are consistent with the Story Model of juror decision-making (Pennington 
& Hastie, 1986, 1992). According to this model, jurors construct an internal narrative about a case and 
then use individual pieces of evidence to confirm or alter this narrative. The notion that jurors make 
attributions about the reason for inconsistencies in confession evidence—and that these attributions 
shape the inferences drawn from the confession evidence—fits well in the story model. 
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different directions was not the focus of that study, and these two conditions were collapsed 
together when assessing the effects of the inconsistency manipulation. With the two 
directional conditions combined, inconsistency reduced guilty verdicts. 
Together, these results align with the rationale outlined above—when confessions 
contain inconsistencies that exaggerate that severity of the crime, guilty verdicts are reduced 
(as in Palmer et al., 2016). When confession contain inconsistencies that downplay the 
severity of the crime, the effects on verdicts are smaller and sometimes null (as in Henderson 
& Levett, 2016, Experiments 1 and 2). However, these studies did not conduct comparisons 
between inconsistencies of different directions; this was the focus of the present research. 
Hypotheses 
In line with Palmer et al.’s (2016) study, we hypothesised that confessions containing 
inconsistencies would be rated as less consistent than confessions that were consistent 
(assuming people noticed the inconsistencies). We further hypothesised that juror perception 
of lower confession consistency would influence judgments of guilt dependent on how the 
jurors attributed the reasons for the errors in the confession. That is, if the confession errors 
increased the severity of the crime and acted to make the suspect look worse, then we 
expected greater inconsistency to be associated with lower judgments of guilt. According to 
attribution theory, because there is no obvious ulterior motive for the worse inconsistencies, 
jurors might assume that the inconsistencies are an indicator that the person might not have 
committed the crime, (“why would someone make themselves look even worse? Maybe he 
doesn’t know what happened because he didn’t commit the crime?”). 
However, if the inconsistencies decreased the crime severity and acted to make the 
suspect seem better, we predicted that while the presence of inconsistencies would reduce 
perceptions of consistency of the confession, this reduction would not necessarily translate to 
lower judgments of guilt. In the case of a better confession, there is a clear ulterior motive for 
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the inconsistencies, with the suspect self-servingly downplaying the severity of the crime, 
(“he’s making errors on purpose to make himself look better. Of course he did it”). 
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-four participants (67 female, 26 male, 1 undisclosed), aged 18 to 63 years (M 
= 26.49, SD = 9.21), volunteered from undergraduate psychology classes at [redacted], as 
well as from the greater university community. The majority were enrolled at university full 
time (98.9%). Participants were awarded with partial course credit, or AUD$10 
remuneration.  The majority of participants (83%) spoke English as their main language at 
home.  Two participants were excluded from the data set for misunderstanding the 
instructions resulting in nonsensical answers – such as believing that the police report had 
been written by the suspect. Participants who provided partial answers were retained in the 
data set, resulting in some analyses with a total N < 94.  
Procedure  
This study was given ethical approval by, and in accordance with the Human 
Research and Ethics Council guidelines of [redacted], which adheres to the National 
Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (NHMRC, 2007, Updated May 2015). 
Supervised testing took place in a laboratory setting in small groups (n=2-3), with 
participants giving informed consent. Participants acted as individual jurors and no 
deliberation or discussion took place. Random allocation was used to place participants in 
one of three confession conditions (worse, consistent, better) in a between-groups design. 
After reading two pieces of written evidence (a typed confession statement, and police 
report), participants answered the pen and paper questions in order, with instructions not to 
read ahead or change their answers once given. Completion time for the task was 
approximately 20 minutes.  
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Stimulus materials 
Participants were given two pieces of evidence from a fictional case: a confession 
statement and a police summary report. The confession was presented as a typed statement in 
which the suspect admits to committing armed robbery at a service station and discharging a 
firearm at the service station attendant. The typed police summary gave detailed information 
from the service station CCTV footage, including the number of shots fired and confirmation 
that the safe was completely emptied in the robbery. The report confirmed that the safe 
contents had been counted and verified by two staff members prior to the robbery taking 
place. This was to ensure that participants did not dismiss any incorrect statement about the 
money stolen as being due to an administrative error or unrelated theft by a staff member. 
Materials were made to appear as if they were copies of evidence from a real case. 
Directional errors manipulation. To test the directional effect of inconsistencies, 
key information in the confession statements was altered so that the confession matched the 
facts of the crime in the police statement (consistent), or the suspect admitted to a greater 
crime than that outlined in the police report (made the participant look worse), or the suspect 
admitted to a lesser crime than that outlined by police (made the participant look better). The 
confession errors were related to key facts of the crime (amount of money stolen, and number 
of shots fired) to ensure that they were salient enough to attract notice and warrant a juror 
questioning the truthfulness of the confession. For example, the police report stated that three 
shots were fired and $2,100 was stolen. In the better condition, the confession stated that one 
shot was fired and several hundred dollars stolen. In the worse condition, the confession 
stated that around 10 shots were fired and $10,000 stolen. 
Measures. After reading the confession statement and police report, participants were 
asked to give a dichotomous (not guilty, guilty) verdict and rate the confidence in their 
verdict on a scale of 1 =not confident at all to 10 = completely confident. Previous research 
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has found that the majority of people see a confession as an honest admission of guilt and 
will render a guilty verdict accordingly (Drizin & Leo, 2004). Therefore, dichotomous 
verdicts may not prove a subtle enough measure of the possible variation in juror belief in 
suspect guilt. To reveal more nuanced perceptions of guilt, we utilised a common practice in 
juror research (see Appleby & Kassin, 2016; Leippe, Eisenstadt, Rauch, & Seib, 2004; Sauer, 
Palmer, & Brewer, 2017; Sommers & Kassin, 2001; Tenney, MacCoun, Spellman, & Hastie, 
2007), creating a continuous variable of judgment of guilt by combining the dichotomous 
verdict and confidence in verdict measures. The resulting scalar variable measures judgment 
of guilt on a scale from -9.5 (complete confidence in a not guilty verdict) to 9.5 (complete 
confidence in a guilty verdict). Participants who score close to zero on this scalar variable are 
those who have little strength of belief that their verdict is correctFollowing the verdict and 
confidence questions, participants were asked to rate the consistency of facts of the crime 
between the two pieces of evidence (from 1 = not consistent at all, to 10 = completely 
consistent). To prime participants to think more closely about the consistency of the 
evidence, they were asked to list why they thought differences (if any) between the pieces of 
evidence might have occurred. Two raters coded a sample of verbatim participant responses 
into those which indicated a belief that the suspect’s error were a ploy to make themselves 
look better, reduce perception of the severity of the crime, or lessen the consequences of the 
crime. These were coded as ‘downplaying’, with responses that did not meet this criterion 




Judgment of guilt 
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Table 1 shows the means, standard deviations and confidence intervals for judgments 
of guilt and perception of consistency ratings for each of the conditions. There was no 
significant overall difference between the judgment of guilt scores for the consistent, better, 
and worse condition, with the mean scores for all three groups indicating that participants 
were reasonably confident that the suspect was guilty.2 The manipulation check of 
consistency indicated that participants were able to perceive that the two inconsistent 
conditions (better, worse) contained confession inconsistencies, and that the consistent 
condition did not, F(2, 90) = 56.10, p < .001. 
[Approximate placement of Table 1] 
Mediation analyses were conducted to test whether the effect of the directional 
manipulations on judgments of guilt were mediated by perceived consistency (from the 
consistency manipulation check). Perceived consistency was considered an important 
mediator as the actual presence of inconsistencies might be unrelated to whether participants 
consciously noticed the inconsistencies or not. A similar concept was explored in Palmer et 
al. (2016), where the degree of perceived consistency (as measured by the number of 
inconsistencies reported) mediated the effect of their manipulation on juror verdicts. To test 
the directional inconsistencies in the present study, two separate mediation analyses were 
conducted: consistent versus better, and consistent versus worse.  
When broken down into its components, the results of the consistent versus better 
conditions (n = 61) suggest that there were two different effects occurring (see Fig. 1). First, 
there was a significant indirect effect, in which the presence of inconsistencies reduced 
perceived confession consistency, (a), b = -3.71, t = -8.98, p < .001, [-4.55, -2.89]. In turn, as 
                                                          
2 In terms of dichotomous verdicts, as expected, the majority (85.1%) of participants gave a guilty 
verdict. There was no significant difference in guilty verdicts between the consistent (90.6%), better 
(83.3%), and worse (81.3%) conditions, n = 94, χ2(2) = 1.22, p = .54. 
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perception of confession consistency reduced, judgments of guilt were similarly reduced (b), 
b = 1.34, t = 3.67, p < .001, [.61, 2.07]. The significant indirect effect of inconsistencies on 
judgments of guilt (ab) confirms that confession errors overall reduced judgments of guilt by 
decreasing perceived consistency, b = -4.99, [-8.42, -1.72]). This finding replicates the 
indirect effect of inconsistencies found in Palmer et al. (2016) and suggests that the greater 
the perceived inconsistency, the larger the reduction in guilt ratings.  
[Approximate placement of Figure 1] 
Second, and separate to the indirect effect, the direct effect of inconsistencies (c’) 
operated in the opposite direction (b = 3.84, t = 2.15, p = .036, [.26, 7.42]), with inconsistent 
testimony increasing judgments of guilt. Opposing direct and indirect effects might seem 
counterintuitive, but these are not uncommon, and are indicative of a mediation model in 
which two opposing mediational processes result in a relationship between the predictor and 
outcome variables that is effectively zero (MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007).  In the case 
of our study, the results suggest that two opposing mechanisms influenced judgments of guilt. 
One involves the indirect effect described above, whereby the presence of inconsistencies 
reduced judgments of guilt via differences in perceived consistency of the confession 
evidence. The second—opposing—mechanism is linked by the direct effect, whereby the 
presence of inconsistencies that made the suspect look better were associated with higher 
judgments of guilt. We return to this issue after reporting the mediation for the consistent 
versus worse conditions. 
The results of the consistent versus worse conditions (n = 62) reflected similar 
findings to the consistent vs better conditions for the indirect effect, but not the direct effect 
(see Fig. 2). For the consistent versus worse conditions, the presence of inconsistencies 
significantly reduced perceived consistency (a), b = -2.10, t = -10.56, p < .001, [-2.50, -1.71], 
with lower perceived consistency in turn resulting in lowered judgments of guilt (b), b = 1.06, 
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t = 2.53, p = .014 [.22, 1.90]. The significant indirect effect of inconsistencies on judgments 
of guilt (ab), b = -2.23, [-4.23, -.33], also aligns with the indirect effect of inconsistencies on 
verdicts found by Palmer et al. (2016), whereby confession inconsistencies reduced 
judgments of guilt. However, unlike in the consistent vs better condition, there was no 
significant direct effect of the manipulation on judgments of guilt in the consistent vs worse 
conditions (b = 1.38, t = 1.27, p = .209 [-.79, 3.56]). Therefore, there was no evidence that 
confession inconsistencies that exaggerated the severity of the crime affected judgments of 
guilt separate to the mechanism of inconsistencies reducing perception of confession 
consistency. 
[Approximate placement of Figure 2] 
Downplaying of guilt 
The comparison of the consistent versus better conditions yielded evidence for two 
opposing mechanisms, one linked to the indirect effect (whereby inconsistencies reduced 
judgments of guilt) and one to the direct effect (whereby inconsistencies increased judgments 
of guilt). We suggest that the most plausible interpretation of these results is that 
inconsistencies that made the suspect look better caused participants to become suspicious 
that the suspect was deliberately making mistakes to downplay the severity of the crime. 
This, in turn, led to higher guilt ratings, independent of perceived consistency of the 
confession. 
As a preliminary test of this explanation, we conducted additional, exploratory 
analyses. In order to explore what attributions participants made about the directional 
confession inconsistencies, participants had been asked to note if they found any 
inconsistencies between the two pieces of evidence, and explain why they thought those 
inconsistencies may have occurred. Responses were coded as to whether the participant 
believed that the confession inconsistencies were due to the suspect deliberately making his 
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actions seem less severe. Examples of responses coded as downplaying include, “cash 
amount differed – this was probably due to the perpetrator deliberately trying to downplay 
his actions”, and “the person who robbed the place is trying to make the crime a lot less 
serious than it actually was”. 
Chi square analysis revealed a significant difference between the consistent and better 
conditions on the number of participants who gave downplaying as a reason for the 
confession inconsistencies, χ2 (1) = 11.23, p < .001. Nine of the 30 participants in the better 
condition responded that confession inconsistencies were due to the suspect deliberately 
making his actions seem less severe. No participants in the consistent or the worse conditions 
believed that the suspect was deliberately trying to downplay the crime. Responses in the 
worse condition were too diverse to be coded into clear categories for the purpose of further 
analysis. Responses in the worse condition generally reflected a broad perception that the 
suspect was an inexperienced criminal, who was not capable of estimate large sums of 
money, or remaining calm enough to count the shots he fired. Examples of responses 
included, “if this was his first offence, $2,000 may look like $10,000 to him”, and “this might 
be due to the robber being in a hurry to leave and didn’t count or was illiterate”.  
A t-test was used to analyse differences in judgments of guilt between those in the 
better condition who specifically mentioned the suspect deliberately downplaying the crime, 
and those in the same condition who did not mention this possibility. The mean judgment of 
guilt was significantly higher for those who believed the suspect to be deliberately attempting 
to downplay the crime (M = 8.28), compared to those who did not mention downplaying as a 
reason for the confession inconsistencies (M = 4.74), t (22.68) = -2.52, p = .019, d = 0.67, 
95% CI [-6.45, -.626]. 
These results are consistent with the idea that participants attributed confession 
inconsistencies that made a suspect appear better (but not worse) to the suspect having the 
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ulterior motive of trying to reduce the perceived consequences of their crime. The lack of a 
similar direct effect (opposing the indirect effect) in the consistent vs worse conditions adds 
further weight to this evaluation of the results, in that there is no apparent ulterior motive for 
someone to deliberately make themselves look worse, whereas there is a plausible ulterior 
motive for wanting to downplay involvement in a crime. 
Discussion 
Results showed that participants were clearly able to see when inconsistencies were 
present in the confessions. However, the direction of confession inconsistencies affected juror 
decisions in a way that we had not hypothesised. We predicted that the two types of 
confession inconsistencies (better, worse) would both affect perceptions of confession 
consistency, but that they would differ in their relationship between perceived consistency 
and judgments of guilt. We hypothesised that greater perceived inconsistency would translate 
to lower judgments of guilt for worse confessions, but not for better confessions. Instead, 
results showed that both types of inconsistencies were well detected by participants, which 
translated to lower judgments of guilt for both the worse and better conditions. The effect of 
confession inconsistencies is more robust than expected, with participants noticing and acting 
on inconsistent evidence, regardless of the direction of the inconsistency. This finding is 
consistent with Woestehoff and Meissner (2016), whose findings suggest that juror beliefs 
and understandings might be changing in a way that gives promise of a more thoughtful and 
knowledgeable juror than previously thought. 
In all conditions, the effect of the consistency manipulation on judgments of guilt was 
mediated by perception of consistency. This indicates that the effect of inconsistencies is 
reliant on the participant actually noticing the inconsistencies and then perceiving them to be 
inconsistent. The important role that perception of consistency might play in affecting 
judgments of guilt can be related to theoretical reasoning about how jurors might use 
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information in their decision making process.  Theories of decision making imply that a 
juror’s internal narrative of the crime adapts to accommodate information that has not 
specifically been provided, such as motivation (Kelley, 1973; Pennington & Hastie, 1986), 
and this information may act to alter their judgments of guilt. In the present study motivation 
for the confession can be extended to encompass the suspect’s reasons for giving a confession 
that is partly inconsistent with the facts of the crime. 
Crucially, there was a difference in the direct effect of inconsistencies on judgments 
of guilt between the better and worse conditions. In the better condition (but not the worse) 
there was a direct effect indicating that inconsistencies acted to increase judgments of guilt 
through a mechanism unrelated to the degree of perceived consistency. This suggests that, 
regardless of the extent to which the confession was perceived as inconsistent, 
inconsistencies that were seen as an attempt to deliberately downplay the severity of the 
crime triggered higher judgments of guilt.  
The backlash effect of the ‘better’ confession  
While mediation analysis showed that inconsistencies overall acted to reduce 
judgments of guilt, when the suspect confessed to a lesser version of the crime there was a 
backlash in which judgments of guilt increased. The apparent mechanism behind the backlash 
is that, if the juror believed that the inconsistencies were an attempt by the suspect to 
deliberately downplay the severity of the crime, then the suspect would be given a higher 
judgment of guilt than if the juror did not believe the suspect was lying for their own gain. 
Verbatim responses about why there were inconsistencies between the suspect’s confession 
and the police report frequently indicated a perception that the suspect was an experienced 
criminal, who deliberately lied about the crime in order to reduce his sentence. Participants in 
the better condition who specifically mentioned that the inconsistencies between the 
confession and police report could be explained by the suspect deliberately downplaying the 
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crime severity, judged the suspect as guiltier than those who did not mention downplaying as 
a possible explanation for the inconsistencies.  
This backlash suggests that, while errors in a confession could act to supress 
automatic judgment heuristics in jurors (where a confession is analogous to guilt), this 
suppression is less likely if the inconsistencies make the suspect look like they are admitting 
to a lesser version of the crime. When a suspect appears to be denying the severity of the 
crime, thus reducing their admitted culpability, the denial acts to increase the belief that the 
confession is an admission of guilt, with the denial of responsibility for the full crime rejected 
on the basis of a strong ulterior motive to deceive. This finding highlights an additional 
reason why the use of minimization techniques in police interrogations are problematic. That 
is, not only does minimization increase the risk of an understated false confession by 
suggesting to the suspect that the crime is not so terrible after all, but the resulting false 
confession can then inflate jurors’ perceptions of that suspect’s guilt later on if the confession 
details a lesser version of the crime. 
Limitations 
A common criticism of lab-based juror studies is that court cases are, by their nature, 
infinitely more variable and complex than can be replicated in a laboratory setting. In the 
present study there is no attempt to claim that the methodology captures an entirely realistic 
jury experience and that findings can be mapped directly on to any single case involving a 
false confession. For example, participants in Kassin and Kiechel’s (1996) experiment were 
coerced into falsely confessing to crashing a computer program in a laboratory. While those 
participants are clearly not in the same position as a person being wrongfully accused of 
murder in a police interrogation, the findings of that experiment allowed greater 
understanding of the situational pressures that can increase the likelihood of an innocent 
person confessing. Similarly, our work aims to illustrate the situations in which people are 
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able to consider the inconsistencies in confessions in a way that inspires new thinking about 
how jurors might be processing evidence that is of varying quality. The present study also 
helps explain how people might process directional errors when they come across them in 
confession evidence, and how that might then affect their perception of a suspect’s guilt. 
Ongoing study into the source of variance in juror decision making allows researchers to 
make advances in understanding how and why jurors sometimes make wrong decisions based 
on poor-quality evidence. The hope is that such research can eventually be applied to the 
ongoing improvement and evolution of legal processes.  
Summary 
This study applied principles of attribution theory to an important applied issue, that 
of the ways in which jurors process confession evidence. The way in which a juror might 
make attributions about the errors in a suspect’s confession is important when considering 
why some false confessions are accepted as truthful by juries, and others are dismissed. The 
present study shows that a person confessing to the crime will be overwhelmingly judged as 
guilty, but if they admit to a lesser version of the crime, some jurors will be even more certain 
that they are guilty. As a jury would not know if the confession was false, the accidental error 
that reduces the severity of the crime could act to make jurors even more certain that the 
person has committed the crime, although the error itself should make them question the 
confession’s veracity.   
18 
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Table 1 
Mean judgment of guilt and perception of confession consistency scores 
  n M (SD) 95% CI 
Judgment of Guilt 
   
 Consistent 31 6.95 (4.50) [5.30, 8.60] 
 Worse 32 5.27 (5.77) [3.19, 7.35] 
 Better 30 5.80 (5.47) [3.76, 7.84] 
Perception of Consistency 
   
 Consistent 32 8.98 (.97) [8.63, 9.34] 
 Worse 31 4.77 (1.95) [4.06, 5.49] 
 Better 30 5.27 (2.08) [4.50, 6.04] 
 
Note. 95% CI = 95% confidence intervals 
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Figure 1. Mediation model testing the effect of inconsistencies (consistent vs better), on 
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Figure 2. Mediation model testing the effect of inconsistencies (consistent vs worse) on 
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